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Abstract:  
Increasing evidence shows that ICT investment improves firm performance. Among the many 
explanations on why ICT contributed to labor productivity surge since 1990, this is the most 
promising one. It is thus necessary to take the firm as an information processing organization, 
putting it in stochastic environment. As perfect information is no longer the assumption, that firms 
exogenously exist in the economy would no longer be assumed here. With these in mind, the paper 
provides a model that involves the division of labor and specialization, the production and 
consumption under demand uncertainty, and the value of information. It shows that under certain 
business conditions, a firm with certain type of information processing ability comes into being 
endogenously. A surplus, which could reasonably be argued as information rent, is generated with 
firm production. The size of this information rent depends on a few key parameters, including the 
level of uncertainty, the degree of market competition, and the cost of information processing. To 
test the model, case studies on the financial industry and the wholesale and retail industry are 
conducted, which corroborate the theoretical predictions of the model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recently, the relation between firm and information needs to be clarified urgently for both practical 
reasons and theoretical reasons. On the practical side, many questions have been raised regarding 
the impact of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on economic growth. Gradually the 
focus of interest has moved from nation level to firm level. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner and 
Sichel (2000), and Jorgenson (2001) generally confirm that ICT contributed around 1/3 of the growth 
in the U.S., through capital-deepening effect and TFP acceleration. Industrial level studies by Stiroh 
(2002), van Ark et al. (2002), Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) show that the service industries benefited 
most from investment in ICT, and that other OECD countries lagged behind the U.S. in exploiting the 
advantages brought by ICT. An EU commission report by Barrios and Burgelman (2007) indicates a 
“first-mover advantage” of the U.S. in applying ICT. This is hardly surprising as Apte and Nath (2004) 
reported that by 1997, 63% of the U.S. GNP is consisted of the so-called “information economy”, 
which is information-related economic activities; and the service industries generally saw a growth 
in information-related activities.  
Furthermore, Bryjolfsson and Hitt (2000) provide firm-level evidence that ICT contributes to firm 
productivity and that organizational investment as a complementary investment to ICT investment is 
important. Matteucci et al. (2005) find firm level evidence that, in the second half of 1990s, 
European OECD countries benefited from their ICT investment, with manufacturing sector benefited 
more than service sector, yet generally are lagged behind as compared to the U.S. performance.  
According to the above, it has come to the stage that we ask what firms do with information, and 
how information technology affects firms’ performance. 
On the theoretical side, information economics has shown us that information plays essential role in 
explaining issues in contract design at individual level and firm level (Macho-Stadler et al. 2001), 
such as insurance policy, signaling, screening, share-cropping, and corporate governance. Beyond 
that, information is also important in explaining equilibriums of the overall economy, for example, 
the role of information in wage policy (labor market equilibrium), in equity market (allocation of 
financial resources), in diversification of prices, and in money market stability (Stiglitz, 2002).  
Moreover, other economic theories of information have been developed over time. Marschak (1954) 
and Arrow (1971, 1985) discuss the economic value of information. The Arrow (1971, 1985) papers 
manage to link economic value of information to the Shannon measure of information. Weitzman 
(1974) discuss the efficiency of two different institutions when uncertainty exists in a system, which 
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assumes imperfect information. Radner and Stiglitz (1984) show that there is nonconcavity in the 
value of information: Having little information is worse than having no information at all. 
Given the importance of information in economic analysis, it also enters the theories of firm. 
Marschak (1954) introduces firm’s structure with corresponding information processing procedure 
to analyze the value of information. Aoki (1986) distinguishes two alternative organizational 
structures of a firm: horizontal vs. vertical. And he found the conditions under which one is more 
efficient than the other when production uncertainty is embedded in the system. With organization 
costs under different firm structures considered, Carter (1995) discusses the effectiveness of seven 
different firm structures in processing information to reduce uncertainty, and thus to improve firm 
performance. Arrow (1975) points out that in an industry with upstream firms and downstream 
firms, downstream firms tend to vertically integrate to acquire input information to reduce 
uncertainty in input supply. And the industrial market tends to evolve from being competitive to 
imperfect competition as vertical integration provides market power. DeCanio and Watkins (1998) 
interpret and model the firm as an information processing network. Within this framework, the 
effect of different organizational structure on efficiency of the firm is discussed. Marschak (2004) 
provided a discussion on how IT investment, which is supposed to lower down information gathering 
cost, help a firm shift to a decentralized organizational form.  
The above mentioned literature implies to us that there must be some connection among 
information processing, organizational structure, IT investment, and firm performance. Yet the 
picture is not really clear or comprehensive.  
While efforts have been made to provide explanations linking information processing, organizational 
structure, ICT investment and firm’s performance in one way or another, no comprehensive model 
has yet been developed to link them together. Therefore, in an attempt to accomplish this specifc 
aim, we see the firm as a structure for information processing, which emerges endogenously from 
industrial markets with demand uncertainties. Information processing ability is seen as the only 
thing that distinguishes firm production from non-firm production; and the ability varies from firm to 
firm. ICT investment, in this model, is used to reduce the cost of information processing. We show 
that the unique informational advantage brings firm a surplus which is reasonably argued as 
information rent, conditional on a few key parameters, including the level of uncertainty, the degree 
of market competition, and the cost of information processing1. 
                                                          
1 If one carries this point of view further, with matured financial market, the return to any productive factor, 
say labor skill, management, capital goods, can be capitalized in its market price. Thus any productive factor is 
readily available from market. Yet after compensating all factors employed, modern firms still stand to acquire 
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We also apply the framework of our theory to the data of the wholesale and retail industry and the 
financial intermediation industry from 10 OECD countries. We investigate the mechanism and the 
extent that the aggregate firm performance – measured as multi-factor productivity – of the 
industry is decided by ICT investment, intensity of market competition, as well as average firm size. It 
is found that the two industries actually have different market structures, from which we infer 
different patterns of impact from the above factors. Interestingly, we don’t observe any “first-mover 
advantage”. Our results suggest that industries in different countries could choose their specific 
optimal level of ICT investment according to their own market structure – not necessarily the higher 
the better. 
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the very theoretical 
backgrounds which lays out the building blocks for our model. Section 3 gives detailed descriptions 
of the model. Section 4 discusses the main results and properties of the model. Section 5 discusses 
implications derived from the model. To corroborate our theory, section 6 is devoted to case studies 
into the financial industry and the retail industry. section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Issues 
 
We have mentioned some literature in the introduction which provide essential understandings and 
ideas for us to start with, but not really the specific techniques that are needed in this paper. In 
order to model this hypothesis, this study relies on the following building blocks. 
Endogenous firm and information: Malmgren (1961) was among the first to ask why multi-person, 
multi-process firms exist in a competitive economy. In his view, a firm functions as an allocating 
mechanism of inputs and outputs.  
The reason that the allocation is not done by markets, which is supposed to be efficient within 
traditional settings, is because that real economy is fraught with uncertainty and incomplete 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
economic surplus – expected sustainable profit. In this sense, all unique advantages that a firm holds to 
generate this profit, be it technological or organizational, can be replicated by obtaining equivalent inputs such 
as manpower, human capital, or licenses from competitive markets of factors. The only thing that hinders one 
firm from replicating another is its information processing ability, namely the ability to acquire the best inputs 
and to process the information of the inputs in order to put them into the right positions. 
Additionally, as information processing is a costly activity, efforts devoted to reduce such cost which include IT 
investment and its complementary organizational investment are supposed to positively affect performance of 
the firm. 
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information2. Even if we talk about expectational equilibrium3, static equilibrium in this case is 
difficult to be reached, due to the formidable amount of information to coordinate individual 
producers.  Firms arise firstly to reduce the requirement on information by integrating production 
procedures, vertically and horizontally, making the convergence of expectations possible; secondly, 
firms arise to process internal and external information, which in return gives firms higher expected 
profit. 
Malmgren (1961) also discussed the two types of information processed by a firm: internal 
information regarding the production related variables; external information regarding the 
environment4 – mainly intermediate input market and product market. Casson (1997) further 
developed the idea as firms’ internal structure would routinize the processing of external 
information to be the processing of internal information, leaving the remaining external information 
area to the entrepreneurs of firms. For the purpose of this paper, we will focus on the routine 
information processing conducted by established firm structure.  
Convex production technology: Next, we review literature that gives us ideas how to model firms 
with the features described above. Yang and Ng (1995) provided a general equilibrium framework in 
which firms are endogenously derived out of economic incentive. For their purpose, convex 
production technology was assumed, as well as multi-stage production. There the central argument 
was that firms substitute market in coordinating production procedure where transaction cost is too 
high. 
This paper provides us with the idea to endogenously derive firms. However, as it operates in an 
environment with certainty, the problems of information and coordination are not included. 
Information and coordination: As mentioned earlier, Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) had 
introduced uncertainty analysis into general equilibrium, but the problems of information and 
coordination were virtually assumed away. 
Demand uncertainty and availability: Carlton (1978) introduced a simple one product economy with 
both demand uncertainty and supply uncertainty. Firms’ existence is given. The product is featured 
                                                          
2 Incomplete information here refers to not knowing what everyone else knows (Malmgren, 1961). This is 
distinguished from the concept of imperfect information, which means not knowing what everyone else has 
done. 
3 Individual agents in the economy can still maximize their expected utility or profit. Arrow (1964) and Debreu 
(1959) have shown that when agents are coordinated by a Walrasian auctioneer, market is cleared with a 
certain set of prices. In this way, equilibrium can be achieved. However, in Malmgren’s case, by assuming away 
the Walrasian auctioneer, the economy can’t automatically find and converge to an expectational equilibrium. 
4 Malmgren (1961) refers to external information as dependent on the so-called “structure of market”. 
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in the market for both its price and availability (possibility of obtaining the product from a supplier 
given a certain price). In this economy, it is possible that each firm make a different decision on its 
production and pricing. It is shown that, however, with each party trying to maximize its expected 
profit or utility, given identical production technology and utility function, the economy converges to 
one combination of price and availability. When demand uncertainty decreases, the economy moves 
closer to equilibrium under certainty, which means a uniform price equal to marginal cost and one 
hundred percent availability. 
Intermediate input and vertical integration: As an extension of this framework, Carlton (1979) took 
the firms’ existence as given, but assumed that initially the firms distribute in the upper stream as 
well as lower stream of a multi-stage production procedure. Rather than assuming existence of 
transaction cost, which is a vague concept that contains many things, uncertainty in demand and 
input supply was assumed. It was shown that firms could have better performance by vertically 
integrate the lower stream production and higher stream production. And vertical integration is 
virtually seen as the move of the integrating firm to acquire information at the stage of production 
been integrated.  
Based on the above three blocks of knowledge quoted, namely information economics, firm theory, 
and general equilibrium under uncertainty, we are ready to merge these ideas together to derive 
endogenous firms from a market under uncertainty. And the firm, because it’s ability of information 
processing, would be rewarded the information rent.  
 
3. The Model 
 
Model Settings 
In this certain industry, it is assumed that there are only one intermediate input M  and one final 
product X . Each individual agent engaged in the industry is endowed with L  labor time which we 
normalize it to one, and is capable of producing either of them with the following technologies: 
(1 )
a
M
a
X
m l
x m lα α−
=
= ⋅
, 1a > , 0 1α< < . 
Xl  and Ml  denote the portions of  L  devoted into production of X  and M , respectively. The 
production technology does not allow two individuals to work together additively or multiplicatively 
in one production procedure, which means for each individual 1Xl ≤  , 1Ml ≤ , and 1X Ml l+ = . 
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Given that markets for both M  and X  exist, since the production technologies are convex with 
respect to individual’s labor, individuals as producers prefer specialization in producing one product 
only and trading it in the market for what they need, provided that the product is with positive price 
in the market.  
Production in the overall industry could then be coordinated via intermediate input market for M . 
Namely, a portion of the population MR  in the industry specializes in producing M , while the other 
portion of the population XR  in the industry specializes in producing X . The latter purchases M  
from the former in order to produce X , and sell their products in the final product market. Each of 
them runs his own shop to sell their products. We name the system as a ‘market-organized 
production’ with full specialization. 
However, due to imperfect information5 with both buyers and producers, for both markets, no buyer 
knows how many others would go to the same shop as he does; and no producer knows how many 
buyers would drop by. Such would generate availability problem when there are suddenly too many 
buyers and the shop runs out of stock. 
Now, what the buyer knows is the price and availability (a kind of quality) that a shop offers; and 
what the producers know is that they face random demand, which in this model we assume it to be 
subject to uniform distribution with parameter λ  (mean as / 2λ , variance as 2 /12λ ). That the 
availability of the final product is decided by the output level of the shop6 is common knowledge to 
both the buyers and the producers. So we have assumed complete information for buyers here, 
mainly for simplicity. This imperfect information setting allows individual shops to ask for arbitrary 
price given his availability, as perfect competition is no longer the case – demand is given 
exogenously. 
However, complete information for buyers means competition still exists among shops, regarding 
policies of price and availability combinations. And such applies to both the intermediate input 
                                                          
5 This is due to the setting of our model that consumers decide simultaneously which shop to visit. For each 
consumer, he/she doesn’t know what the others have decided. Thus it is imperfect information, rather than 
incomplete information. 
6 This assumption was used by Carlton (1978). The availability issue is incurred by uncertain demand. When 
realized demand exceeds suppliers’ production level, which is decided according to their expectation, 
availability is no longer one hundred percent.  
For such a setting, there are two implicit assumptions. Firstly, production plan is implemented before the 
demand is realized. Secondly, each consumer enquires with any shop for only once. If the shop runs out of 
stock, the consumer won’t be able to try another shop. For simplicity of our analysis, the current paper 
modifies the second assumption into that for each unit of demand, buyer tries only one shop. 
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market and the final product market. It is shown that there exists a unique equilibrium, in which 
prices of the products convey information on intensity of market competition.  
As consumers, individuals consume X . With availability considered, the utility of consuming x  
units of X is, 
( )XA XU x Q P= ⋅ .  
( )XAQ ⋅  is the availability of the commodity, which is measured as the probability of obtaining X 7. 
The availability of the commodity can be taken as a kind of quality of it. XP  is the price of X . It is 
intuitive that 0
X
A
X
Q
P
∂
>
∂
8. 
 
Consumer Behavior 
A typical consumer’s decision problem is, 
max. ( )
. .
X
A X
X
U x Q P
s t P x I
= ⋅
⋅ =
, where I  is the exogenous income9. 
To maximize utility, consumers would require the combination of price and availability offered by a 
shop to satisfy the first order condition10: 
(2.1) 0
X
A XQ Pβ= ⋅ .  
                                                          
7 And it will be illustrated in the subsection for the X -producers’ behavior. 
8 Availability can be seen as quality of the product. For this reason, the X - producer does not necessarily 
consume his own product, as he may well produce and sell high quality product, but consume low quality 
product, according to his preference. Thus what he cares about, as the m  producers do as well, is the 
monetary revenue he receives from the market. 
9 Note that this is not a closed one-industry economy. Rather, the object under study is one specific industry 
from a multi-industry economy. Consumers come to consume this industry’s product with their income each 
earned from this industry or from other industries. For this reason, income constraint is not an endogenous 
variable. And thus the utility function is specifically for the consumption of products of this specific industry.  
10 Put Lagrange function as ( ) ( )XA X Xx Q P I P xψ ν= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ . F.O.C. gives ( ) 0
X
A X XQ P Px
ψ
ν
∂
= − ⋅ =
∂
 
and '( ) 0XA X
X
x Q P x
P
ψ ν∂ = ⋅ − ⋅ =
∂
. Thus ( ) '( )X XA X A X XQ P Q P P= ⋅ . Then ( )
X
A XQ P  is solved as equation 
(2.1), where the constant term is intuitively set to be zero, and 0β ν= . 
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0β  is a parameter that could be interpreted as the reverse of the shadow price of obtaining one unit 
of X  with certainty (not the one unit of demand realized with availability smaller than 1). It is 
decided by product market competition at the equilibrium, as will be seen later. 
Since 0X
X A
II
x
P Q
β⋅
= = , it can be shown that 0X
A
x
Q
∂
<
∂
, as well as that 
2
2 0( )XA
x
Q
∂
>
∂
. 
Actually, when pricing condition 0β  has been decided, maximum utility is fixed at 
*
0U I β= ⋅ .
11 
Thus we have the following diagram: 
 
Figure 1: Indifference curve of utility function and the budget constraint of consumer 
 
It can be observed that the indifference curve of maximum utility overlaps with the budget 
constraint curve. And the position of the ( , )xAQ x curve depends on . The optimal combination of 
x
AQ  and x  for the consumers could be any point along the 
*U  curve. 
 
The Individual X -Producers’ Decision 
On the demand side, an individual X -producer faces random demand with uniform distribution, 
which could be described by parameter 1λ . Thus probability density of the uniform distribution for 
                                                          
11 Note that although this result shows that consumers choice on price and quality combination has no effect 
on utility gained, the optimization is necessary and important in the sense that it imposes constraint on 
producer’s pricing behaviour, as will be shown later. 
* 0 which overlaps with XA X
A
I
U x Q x
Q
β⋅
= ⋅ =  
( , )XAQ x  
x  
X
AQ  
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the X -producer is 
1
1
1
( )kλφ λ
= , 1[0, ]k λ∈ , where k  denotes the realization of per shop random 
demand. It can be inferred that the larger the parameter 1λ , the greater the volatility in the market. 
On the production side, the X -producer buys Xm  units of the intermediate input. And then with 
full specialization, his output level is (1 )aXm L
α α⋅ −⋅ . As we have normalized L  to be one, the output 
level of each x -producer simply is (1 )1aX Xm m
α α α⋅ −⋅ = . Next, the X -producer needs to decide how 
many units of  to purchase from the market by maximizing his expected revenue. 
Charging at a price iXP , the revenue function of the i th X -producer is, 
,  if 
={
,  if 
iX
iX
P k k m
m P k m
α
α α
π
≤
>
. 
To maximize his expected revenue, the i th X -producer would decide the optimal output level and 
optimal price level according to 
1 1
0
*
max. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S.T. ( )
X
A
X
iX A
m
M
X iX X iX M X M
m
X
P iX
iX
E P k k dk m P k dk P m Q P
I
U Q P U
P
α
α
α
λ λπ φ φ
∞ 
= + − 
  
= ≥
∫ ∫
, 
where ( )
A
M
MQ P  is the availability of intermediate input M  from the intermediate input market. 
The constraint condition means that the X -producer needs to offer a combination of price and 
availability that delivers a utility at least as high as the average level in the market.  
The constraint condition is equivalent to consumers’ optimization condition (2.1). *U  is the average 
level of utility which a typical consumer can obtain from the market, by consuming with a certain 
combination of XP  and ( )A
X
XQ P . A seller thus has to provide a combination of price and availability 
which makes consumers at least as well off as this one.  
Given his output level, this constraint condition actually decides the price that the X -producer can 
charge: Since 
1
( ) ( )
A
X M
A X MQ F k m Q P
α
λ= < ×  is the availability ( 1 1
0
( ) ( )
Xm
XF k m k dk
α
α
λ λφ< = ∫  , the 
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cumulative density function), the i th X -producer can charge a price
1
0
( ) ( )
A
M
X M
iX
F k m Q P
P
α
λ
β
< ×
= , according to equation (2.1). 
Now the X -producer is to make two decisions with iXP  considered exogenous: the quantity of Xm  
to purchase; and the price of intermediate input . Note that similar with the final product , the 
availability of  is a function of the price that the buyer – X -producer –  is willing to accept. 
It’s not difficult to show according to F.O.C. of the X -producer’s maximization that12  
(2.2) 1A
M
MQ Pβ= . 
1β  is subject to equilibrium of the competitive market of intermediate input M . 
And the demand for  is decided by the F.O.C., 
(2.3) 
1 1
1
0
2 ( ) ( )
X
X
m
M
X
X iXm
P
m k dk k k dk
m P
α
α
α
λ λ
αα φ φ
∞
− + =∫ ∫ . 
Accordingly, expected revenue of the   - producer is 
1
1 1
0 10
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
X
A A
A
X
M Mm
X M M M
X X X M
m
F k m Q P Q P
E k k dk m k dk m Q P
α
α
α
λ α
λ λπ φ φβ β
∞  < ×
 = + − ⋅ 
    
∫ ∫ . 
 
The M - Producers’ Decision 
                                                          
12 iXP  is exogenous to the X -producer’s optimization problem at this moment for two reasons: on the one 
hand the producer can decide arbitrarily to charge any price he wants and it is only when the market 
converges to the equilibrium that he is bounded by the constraint condition; on the other hand the price is to 
be determined by 0β  in the equilibrium, which is an exogenous variable to individual producers. 
Thus we have 
1 1
0
( )
' ( ( ) ( ) ) 0
m
M M
A iX M A
M m
E
Q P kP k dk m P k dk P m Q m
P
α
α
α
λ λ
π ∞ ∂
= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅ = 
∂   
∫ ∫ , and 
1 1
0
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) 0
m
M M M
iX iX M A A M AM
A m
E
P kP k dk m P P k dk P Q m Q P Q m
Q
α
α
α
λ λ
π ∞ ∂
= + − − ⋅ ⋅ = 
∂   
∫ ∫ . Combining 
the two we have 
1
'
' MMA
P
Q
= , which gives us equation (2.2). 
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Again let  denote the realized per shop random demand on M . A typical M - producer faces 
random demand which is subject to uniform distribution parameterized by 2λ , such that 
2
2
1
( )kλφ λ
=  is the probability density function, 2[0, ]k λ∈ . Parameter 2λ  describes the volatility in 
the intermediate input market, and is itself partially decided by the professional distribution of 
population: x
m
R
R
13. However, there is a precondition for the M - producer to fully specialize in the 
production of : 2 1λ ≥ . Otherwise, given that an  - producer knows that the maximum of 
demand coming to him is less than one, there is no reason to fully specialize in the production of M : 
1 1a = . 
The revenue function for the i th M - producer is, 
,  if 1
={
,  if 1
iM
iM
P k k
P k
π
≤
>
. 
The  producer’s faces a decision problem that 
2 2
1
0 1
*
max. ( ) ( ) ( )
S.T. ( | ) ( )
iM iM
X iM X
E P k k dk P k dk
E P E
λ λπ φ φ
π π
∞
= +
≥
∫ ∫
. 
The constraint condition is equivalent to the X -producers’ optimization condition (2.2). It means 
that the combination of price and availability of  offered by one  - producer in the market should 
provide the buyer – X -producers – with an expected revenue at least as high as the average level. 
Given that the  - producer’s output level is fixed at 1 (if 2 1λ ≥ ), the constraint condition already 
decides the price that can be charged for  at the equilibrium: 2
1
( 1)
iM
F k
P λ
β
<
= , since 
2 2
1
0
( ) ( 1) ( )
A
M
iMQ P F k k dkλ λφ= < = ∫ . 
                                                          
13 Intuitively, 2λ  (as well as 1λ ) describes the largest possible demand that one shop-runner might face. It 
must be jointly decided by factors like the size of the population of buyers and purchasing power of the buyers.  
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Accordingly, expected revenue of the M -producer is14 
2
2 2
1
1 0 1
( 1)
( ) ( ) ( )m
F k
E k k dk k dkλ λ λπ φ φβ
∞<  
= + 
 
∫ ∫ . 
Virtually the only decision for the -producer at the equilibrium is whether he wants to stay in the 
industry. When his expected revenue deteriorates, he might wish to leave. With the exit of some M
- producers, parameter 2λ  would adjust to push up the expected revenue of the rest of the M - 
producers. 
 
The Equilibrium of Market-Organized Production 
That individually specialized X  and M  producers implement the two-stage production procedure 
via market transactions of intermediate input M  is referred to as market-organized production. 
Now we try to look for the equilibrium of the markets of an industry organized as this. 
Since we have identical consumers and identical producers in this economy, it is intuitive that the 
equilibrium of this economy is a certain combination of price and availability for each of the two 
products, to which all producers and buyers would converge. 
 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium in which the producers in either market produce at the same output 
level to offer the same availability and sell their product at the same price is stable.    
Take the X -producer as an example. Given such equilibrium is arrived at, suppose that firm  i  
disobeys the equilibrium ( , )
A
X
XP Q  and raises its price, resulting in no purchase from the consumers 
because of its higher price with the same availability as before. However, it is possible that he uses 
the higher price to pay high production cost to increase availability of his product. To do this, note 
that the availability of intermediate input is virtually fixed because the M -producer can’t increase 
its production anymore, so the x -producer can’t get higher availability of M , by paying a higher 
price. The only way to increase output, and thus availability, is to increase its purchase of M . 
Nevertheless this is not a revenue maximizing method, as the marginal product of  would decrease, 
                                                          
14 With uniform distribution, 2
1 2
1
1
( ) (1 )
2M
E
λπ
β λ
= ⋅ −
⋅
. Thus ( )ME π  increases as 2λ  decreases. 
14 
 
which means cost is to be incurred to increase production is going to be higher than the possible 
increase in price of X .  
Alternatively, if one deviates by quoting a price lower than xP , he loses expected profit if he 
produces at equilibrium output level. However, if he chooses to cut down his output level, note that 
the marginal product of M  is higher than the price of  in the market. And that implies he should 
increase his production. 
Thus we find that the equilibrium is stable at least in its neighbourhood. The proof of this point can 
be found in the appendix A. 
The other important property of the equilibrium is  
(2.4) ( ) ( )X ME Eπ π= . 
The property helps us determine pricing parameters 0β  and 1β . Without loss of generality, 
normalize the price of M  as 1MP = . Then we have 
2
21
2
( 1) 1
( 1)
2M
F k
F k
P
λ
λβ λ
<
= = < = . 
Using equation (2.4), we have 0β  in terms of m - the optimal quantity of M that X  - producers 
would like to purchase. 
2 1 1 1
2 2 2
2
0
0 1
0 1
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( 1)
X
x
m
X X
m
X
F k F k m k k dk m k dk
k k dk k dk m k
α
α
α α
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ
φ φ
β
φ φ φ
∞
∞
 
< ⋅ <  + 
  =
+ + ⋅ <
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
Applying the above results to equation (2.3), when 
1
2
α = , Xm  can be solved in terms of 1λ  and 2λ . 
Thus the output level of the X - producer simply is 
1
2
Xq m= , which has different value according to 
the specific value of 1λ  and 2λ (Figure 2)
15. 
                                                          
15 For certain combinations of  ( 1λ , 2λ ), Xm  turns negative, simply because specializing in producing X  is no 
longer optimal, due to volatile uncertainty in the markets. Mathematically, we could add non-negative 
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Figure 2: Output level q  of x -producers with specific values of 1λ  and 2λ .  
 
Since 0β  can be written in terms of Xm , 0β  is also decided by 1λ  and 2λ  (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Pricing parameter 0β  with specific values of 1λ  and 2λ . 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
constraint to the X - producer’s maximization problem, which gives us corner solutions and eliminate the 
negative part. However, doing this would not influence any of our major conclusions. 
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It is not difficult to observe that both output level and pricing parameter assume values with 
economic sense within certain range of the values of 1λ  and 2λ (Figure 4 and 5). 
 
Figure 4: Contour plot of q . q  is positive in the area below the contour curve. 
 
Firm Production 
We are now ready to derive firms with features identified by Malmgren (1961): a multi-person, 
multi-process mechanism of allocating inputs and outputs. For the purpose of examine our 
hypothesis, the firm derived in this model will be assumed with no advantages in terms of 
production technology and retail channels (Figure 6).  
 
… m m m m m 
x x x x x x … 
The firm production 
Shop1 Shop2 Shop3 Shop4 Shop5 Shop6 … Shop n 
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Figure 5: The structure of a firm 
As described by Figure 5, a firm hires individuals from the labor market, making them specialize 
either in producing  or producing X . The production and supply of M  is pooled together with its 
products distributed to individual X –shops according to Figure 6. The production and supply of X  
is still done at individual shops. We assume that the shops are relatively independent and do not 
communicate with each other. Thus the only difference between the firm production and the 
market-organized production is that a labor market replaces the intermediate input market. By 
doing this, a firm processes the information of supply and demand of intermediate input within the 
firm.  
At each X -shop, the expected revenue is, 
1 1
0
( ) ( )
f
f
m
X f
m
P k k dk m k dk
α
α
α
λ λφ φ
∞ 
 +
  
∫ ∫ . 
Decision problem for the firm to maximize its expected profit is, when there are i  shops, 
1 1
0
max. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ( 1))
f
f
m
f X i i i f i i f f
i m
E P k k dk m k dk w i m C i m
α
α
α
λ λπ φ φ
∞ 
 = + − × × + − ⋅ +
  
∑ ∫ ∫  
1
*. . ( )f
X
I
s t F k m U
P
α
λ⋅ < ≥ . 
( )C ⋅  is the informational cost incurred by running such an organization, with ' 0C > , '' 0C > . For 
simplicity, let’s assume that C  takes the function form of 2( )C z zθ= ⋅ , while θ  reflects the level 
of information processing ability, which mainly depends on factors like the entrepreneur’s ability, 
communication infrastructure, and organizational structure. And w  is the wage that firm pays to its 
employees. 
Due to the existence of informational cost, the number of firms that qualifies in terms of information 
processing ability is limited – only those that make non-negative expected profit could survive. 
Moreover, due to that such cost is monotonically increasing, the size of a firm is limited with 
informational cost considered. Thus it is reasonable to assume such a scenario that the market-
organized production with individual producers involved is still dominating the economy. Or 
alternatively, we say that information processing ability is scarce resource. Thus the firm production, 
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either in terms of firm’s size or in terms of number of firms, could not affect the pricing parameter 
0β  given by the equilibrium of markets dominated by market-organized production.  
Therefore, under the firm production arrangement, availability of the product is 
1
( )XA fQ F k m
α
λ= < ; and with pricing parameter 0β  from the equilibrium of market-organized 
production, the price that the firm can charge is: 
1
0
( )f
X
F k m
P
α
λ
β
<
= . 
As the expected labor income level in the industry in equilibrium is not affected by the entry of firms 
in the current scenario, the wage w  that the firm needs to offer in order to make individual agents 
indifferent between taking a job and running his individual shop is ( ) ( )X Mw E Eπ π= = . Proof can 
be found in appendix B. 
Rewrite the maximization problem of a firm as 
1 1
2
2 2
0
1
1 0 1
max. ( ) ( ) ( )
( 1)
( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ( 1))
f
f
m
f X f
m
f f
E i P k k dk m k dk
F k
k k dk k dk i m C i m
α
α
α
λ λ
λ
λ λ
π φ φ
φ φ
β
∞
∞
 
 = × +
  
<  
− + × × + − ⋅ + 
 
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
. 
The firm needs to decide its optimal supply of intermediate input  to each shop, as well as its 
optimal size – how many shops to run. 
According to the first order conditions (when 
1
2
α = ), 
(2.5) 
1 1 2 2
1
0 0 1*
2
( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( )
2 ( 1)
f
f
m
X f f
m
f
P k k dk m k dk m k k dk k dk
i
m
α
α
α
λ λ λ λφ φ φ φ
θ
∞ ∞   
 + − + + 
    =
+
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
, 
and 
(2.6) 
( )
( )
22/3
2
1 1
2/3
2
1 1
2 1 4 1
*
2 1 4
fm
λ λ
λ λ
 + + − 
 =
+ +
. 
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fm  is now in terms of 1λ  only (Recall that Xm  was solved in terms of both 1λ  and 2λ ). Firm size i  
is in terms of 1λ  and 2λ . 
 
Figure 6: Plotting *fm .  Horizontal axis is 1λ , and vertical axis is fm . 
Output level at each shop is 
1
2
fq m= . 
 
Figure 7: Plotting 
1
2
fq m= . Horizontal axis is 1λ , and vertical axis is q . 
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Figure 8: Plotting 0i β θ⋅ ⋅ , which implies the size of the firm when 0β   and θ  are given. 
Total employment of the firm is ( 1)i m⋅ + , which can also be written in terms of 1λ  and 2λ . 
 
4. Information Rent 
 
The firm decisions made above deliver an expected profit 
(3.1) 
2 3*
* *2 2
2
0 1 1 2
1
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( 1) ( 1)
2 2
f f
f f f
m mi
E i m i m
α α
π θ
β λ λ λ
= ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ + . 
Inserting equation (2.5) and (2.6) into (3.1), the expected profit can be written in terms of 1λ  and 2λ . 
Figure 9 gives expected profit of the firm under different combinations of 1λ  and 2λ , when pricing 
parameter 0β  and parameter of informational cost θ  are given
16. 
                                                          
16 Pricing parameter 0β  is decided by 1λ  and 2λ  in the equilibrium of market-organized production. However, 
setting 0β  as irrelevant to 1λ  and 2λ  is a generalized case that the firm does not necessarily always stay in an 
environment dominated by market-organized production – intuitively 0β   increases as number of firms 
increases because of competition. Should this be the case, 0β  exogenously assumes different value. 
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Figure 9: Plotting ( )fE π  when 0 0.8β = , 0.1θ = . 
Given low enough informational cost of the firm (in this case, 0.1θ = ), the result comes that the 
firm production conditionally makes positive expected profit. It shows the motivation of starting up 
a firm, as well as the sustainability of firm production. 
Note firstly that this positive expected profit of the firm is a surplus, since all visible productive 
factors – intermediate input and labor input – have been decently paid at market rates. And 
secondly, since the basic difference between firm production and market-organized production is 
that the firm has had the information regarding production and demand of intermediate input 
processed, the surplus can only be ascribed to the information that the firm has obtained. Thirdly, 
previously we have assumed that the information processing ability is unique to a firm, which is 
equivalent to that parameter  is unique to a firm. Thus the supply of such ability is completely 
inelastic.  
In order to get this information processing ability into work, with its best effort and with the true 
information, the right to claim this surplus (residual return) should be assigned to the provider of 
this ability. The argument is similar as the one in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) about team production. 
Furthermore, not all firms earn positive expected profit. It will be shown later that with 
informational cost increasing (value of  growing), surplus vanishes. Firms at the margin make it 
break-even – whatever they get from controlled information would be paid to cover informational 
cost. Thus according to the theory of economic rent, the surplus claimed by the provider of 
information processing ability – the firm, is considered economic rent, both in the sense of Ricardian 
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rent and in the sense of Paretian rent (Wessel, 1967; Lackman, 1976).  Since the source of this 
surplus is information, we name it “information rent”. 
Next, we analyze some properties of this information rent to the firm. 
Proposition 2:  Ceteris paribus, the firm’s information rent depends on both volatility in the 
intermediate input market and volatility in the final product market. The more volatile the markets 
are, the greater the economic rent would be. 
It can be shown that the firm’s information processing ability is only profitable within a certain range 
of value of parameters, which describe the market environment that they face (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10: Contour plot of ( ) 0fE π = . ( 0 0.8β = , 0.1θ = ) 
 
According to the plot, for certain ranges of 1λ  and 2λ , the information rent to firm’s information 
processing ability is positive. Combining this with what we see in Figure 9, the implication is that 
given volatility of demand in the final product market ( 1λ ), the greater the volatility of demand in 
the intermediate input market ( 2λ ), the higher the information rent is. But growing volatility of 
demand in the final product market ( 1λ ) has a threshold effect on information rent – it drives 
information rent up in a certain range, but then makes the information rent vanishing. 
On the other hand, given 1λ  and 2λ , values of 0β  and θ  would decide the sign and scale of the 
information rent.  
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Proposition 3: By entering the firm decision on firm size (), pricing parameter 0β  , which is decided 
by outside market environment, and informational cost parameter θ  would also decide economic 
rent to entrepreneur’s information processing ability. The changes of the two parameters both have 
threshold effects on the sign and scale of economic rent, via their effects on firm size . They also 
have further influence on the position of the threshold. 
Proof: 
Taking derivative of  ( )fE π  w.r.t. , 
1.5
2
2
0 1 1 2
( ( )) 1 1
( ) (1 )( ) 2 ( 1)
2 2
f f f
f f
E m m
m i m
i
π
θ
β λ λ λ
∂
= − − − − +
∂
. 
When 
1.5
2
0 1 1 2
2
1 1
( ) (1 )( )
2 2
2 ( 1)
f f
f
f
m m
m
i
m
β λ λ λ
θ
− − −
>
+
 (the threshold),  
we have 
( ( )
0f
E
i
π∂
<
∂
. 
From equation (2.5) it can be observed that a smaller 0β  gives a larger i . When  is smaller than the 
threshold, economic rent to information processing ability could be higher than before. But once  
has passed the threshold, a smaller 0β  reduces the economic rent. 
The effect of a decreasing θ  or 0β  brings more potential to increase economic rent to the firm. This 
is because on the one hand it increases the value of i ; On the other hand it also increases the value 
of threshold, leaving more room for the firm to grow. However, when θ  is increasing, the negative 
effect on economic rent could be stronger as well.  
 
5. Implications 
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The current model does not close as what usually happens in a general equilibrium setting, by 
setting the income of consumers of product X  as endogenously decided by pricing parameter 0β
17. 
Rather, it is better that we consider it as an equilibrium analysis for a certain industry existing in a 
broader economy – there are other industries in the economy. Consumers of product X  come from 
all industries including the one under discussion. Then the idea that consumers have exogenously 
determined income would make sense.  
However, it does require certain extent of imagination to accept that, the pre-determined 
population engaged in this certain industry reflects an equilibrium of the overall economy which is 
beyond the analysis of this model, so that the demand and supply of X  could be balanced. As with 
the problem of optimal division of labor inside the industry, given the business environment – 
demand uncertainty, the current model deals with it.  
Recall the essential assumptions we have made in the model: 
1. There is convex production technology openly available for all producers – individual and 
firm. It provides incentive for specialization. 
2. There is imperfect but complete information for both buyers and sellers. The buyers 
randomly visit seller’s shops. As a result, sellers find themselves facing demand uncertainty, 
which in this model is subject to uniform distribution. For the same reason, the availability of 
the product from one shop is smaller than one hundred percent. This applies to both 
intermediate input market and final product market. 
3. A firm is featured as an organization with multi-person and multi-stage production. It 
employs labor from the labor market, and uses the same production technology to produce 
both intermediate input and final product. It sells its final product at individual shops. The 
shops are independent from each other. 
4. The only difference between firm production and market-organized production is that, a 
firm has the production process organized by processing the information of demand and 
supply of the intermediate input. In the latter, no one knows more than anyone else. 
5. Information processing is a costly process. 
With these settings, any superior performance of a firm must be due to its informational advantage. 
And we come up with the following implications derived from such a model: 
                                                          
17 Pricing parameter 1β , which works for the intermediate input market, is virtually given by normalizing MP  
to be one, and by assuming m -producers would fully specialize. Thus we have 21
( 1)
1
F kλβ
<
= . 
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1. Under certain conditions, firm production generates a positive surplus, after all factors and 
costs been well-paid.  The advantage is not due to better technology or better organizational 
form, but unique information processing ability only. For this reason, the surplus is named 
“information rent”. 
2. A firm’s performance depends on a set of parameters, among which 	
 and 	 describe 
extent of demand uncertainty in the two markets,  describes pricing condition given by 
the competitive market, and  describes level of informational cost. 
3. The competitive market environment – described by 0β  – affects the size of information 
rent in a few ways. One is that it decides the expected income level of individual producers -  
( ) ( )X ME Eπ π= , which is equivalent to labor cost w  of the firm when the market-
organized production dominates. Secondly, as indicated by proposition 3, it has certain 
impact on firm size, which has a threshold effect on information rent. 
4. For a firm, pricing parameter 0β  deteriorate in two ways. When the market is dominated by 
market-organized production, overly volatile demand uncertainties in the two markets lead 
to too small a 0β , which drives out information rent. When the market is dominated by firm 
production, with the number of capable competitor firms increasing, 0β  turns larger
18. This 
also eventually drives information rent to become zero. The latter case might be due to spill-
over of information processing ability, as people gradually learn to mimic entrepreneur’s 
practice. This could be called the dissipation of rent. 
Now we are ready to examine whether information rent exists as a sustainable source of firm profit 
in real economy. We are interested in the service industries which are close to our assumptions in 
many ways.  Specifically, in the current study, we take the wholesale & retail industry and the 
financial intermediation industry as examples. 
Firstly, production technology of these industries is plain and open to anyone. No one can claim a 
patent on the design or organization of a store; nor could one claim patent on an investment tool 
tailored for customers. Actually, there exist many individually run retail shops, as well as many self-
employed financial agents. Secondly, demand in the markets do appear random to certain extent. 
Thirdly, both the labor market and final product market are relatively competitive in the two 
industries, which means market power can hardly be the source of sustainable profit. However, 
neither are they perfectly competitive with homogeneity embedded. We do observe that with the 
                                                          
18 There could be less volatility in the intermediate input market, which means a smaller 2λ . According to 
Figure 3, this would deliver a larger 0β . 
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same commodity sold in the shop, or with the same banking service from a financial institution, 
different prices are charged by different suppliers. Thus the reality is close to our assumption in 
model. Fourthly, according to empirical studies (van Ark, 2002), these two industries do benefited 
substantially from ICT advancement and investment in the U.S., which is a result that could be 
predicted by our model. For these reasons, we use the two industries as our examples. 
 
6. Case studies 
 
To echo the proposition that U.S. stands a “First-mover advantage” (Barrios and Burgelman, 2007), a 
cross-country industry-level panel data analysis will be conducted. The wholesale and retail industry 
and the financial intermediation industry are the subjects of this empirical analysis. Our sample 
includes data of the two industries from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, 
Italy, Australia, South Korea, Denmark, Finland, and Austria. The range of time period is from 1980 to 
2005. Data is collected respectively from the EU-KLEMS database, the OECD.stats database, and 
statistics bureaus of the respective countries. 
Combining the theoretical frameworks of growth accounting approach in literature and our model, 
the following econometric model is established.  
Real output of industry i  is, 1( , )i i i i i i i iY A F K N A K N
ρ ρ−= × = × × . 
where K  is capital stock, N  is employment, and A is multi-factor productivity. 
With iP  denoting the price of the product, nominal output then is, 
1
i i i i i iP Y P A K N
ρ ρ−× = × × × . 
It follows that (1 )
i i i i i iP Y P A K N
g g g g gρ ρ× = + + + −  
Next, for two reasons we want to look at the growth of nominal value-added per labor hour rather 
than real value-added per labor hour: Firstly, it’s technically difficult to distinguish how much the 
growth of value in current price of a service is due to quality improvement and how much of that is 
due to inflation19. A measure of real value-added could thus be a biased measure. Secondly, the 
purpose of the study is the firms’ ability to generate profit (rather than the ability to produce), which 
is not a homogeneous function of prices of degree one.  
                                                          
19 Interested readers can refer to SNA93 for detailed information. 
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Thus we have, 
(1 )
i i i i i i i iP Y H P A K N H
g g g g g g gρ ρ× − = + + ⋅ + − ⋅ −  
where 
iH
g  is the growth rate of labor hour. 
If we name the nominal value-added per labor hour as ‘nominal labor productivity’, it’s growth rate 
( iglph ) is decided as, 
(5.1) 
(1 )
i ii A k i
glph INF g g glqα ρ ρ= ⋅ + + ⋅ + − ⋅
 
where ik  is capital per labor hour, and iglq  is the measure of growth of labor quality as defined by 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). iA
g
 is the growth rate of industrial multi-factor productivity, which is 
the key variable that we use to measure the aggregate firm  performance in the industry. 
INF is the general inflation rate of the economy, which is used to proxy for iP
g
 with iP
g INFα= ⋅
. 
This treatment is necessary since it’s difficult to accurately estimate the price for a single unit of 
service, and the overall inflation data is readily available. 
It is important to bear in mind that the subjects under study are service industries, which means the 
iA
g
term, as the aggregate firm performance of the industry, hardly contain technological 
improvement in the production of the service provided by the industry. Additionally, technological 
improvement in capital goods is counted for in the growth of capital stock per capita; and labor skill 
improvement is counted for in the iglq  term. Therefore, according to our model, the iAg  term 
should only be explained by cost of information (described by parameter ), market competition 
(described by parameter ), and size of firms.  
To examine this hypothesis, we further run the regression of 
iA
g  over the following explanatory 
variables, as implied by our theoretical model: 
• Growth of ICT capital stock of the industry, measured as 
iIT
g , to control for cost of 
information; 
• Growth of level of labor compensation in the very industry, measured as 
iILCPH
g ;  
• Average firm size of the industry, measured as iFZ ; 
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The regressions are designed to find evidence that  ,  , and firm size impact economic 
performance of firms in the way that our model predicts; and secondly, to examine if the expected 
profit which is sustainably generated from information processing ability of firms, is the reason that 
U.S. industries have had outstanding performances. 
Therefore, after iA
g
 is estimated from equation (5.1), we have, 
(5.2) 1 2 3
( )
i i iA IT ILCPH i ij i
g g g FZ uβ β β ε= + + + +
, 
where ij
u
is fixed country effect of country j, and iILCPH
g
 is the growth rate of industrial per hour 
labor compensation, which is used as a proxy for  
 .    
As TFP (Multi-factor productivity) data for each industry in each country is readily available from EU-
KLEMS database using growth accounting method, we would also like to run regressions (5.3) 
against this data to check if the results from the above are reliable, as a robustness test. 
(5.3) 1 2 3( )i i itfp IT ILCPH i ij ig g g FZ uβ β β ε= + + + +  
 
Case I: The wholesale and retail industry 
Figure 11 gives the mean and standard deviation of some key variables relevant to firm performance, 
according to our theoretical model. It can be observed that industries in different economies follow 
different patterns of growth, probably due to the fact that they are running at different stages of 
development. The U.S. wholesale and retail industry seems to be relying more on growth of ICT 
capital stock – a relatively stable and high growth in ICT drives median level of growth of nominal 
labor productivity; the industry of Japan seems to be relying more on significant labor quality 
improvement, while growth of labor compensation is among the lowest, hinting that firm 
performance benefited more from slack domestic competition; the industry of U.K. and Korea has 
low ICT growth, low labor quality growth, while industrial labor compensation grows relatively faster, 
supporting firm performance to surge high. Combining data of average firm size in the industry, it is 
observed that firms in the industries of the two countries experienced faster expansion. 
While there is a variety in our individual observation, by pooling the countries together in panel 
regression, the pattern for this wholesale and retail industry is quite clear (table 1) 
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Table 1: Wholesale and retail industry regression results 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
Regressand:     
Resid_gtfp Yes  Yes  
gtfp  Yes  Yes 
Regressors:     
gitph 0.09** 0.10** 0.12** 0.12** 
gitph(-1) - - -0.06 -0.03 
gilcph 0.40** 0.40** 0.38** 0.39** 
fz -1.64 9.14** -0.78 9.62** 
C -0.02 -0.11** -0.03 -0.11** 
Fixed country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period None None None None 
R-squared 0.38 0.50 0.39 0.50 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.88 2.16 1.88 2.18 
* 10% significant; ** 5% significant. 
 
It can be read from table 1 that regressions results applying equation (5.2) and equation (5.3) are 
very close. The results generally reveal that ICT capital stock, which reduces the cost of information 
processing, has a positive impact on the performance of firms; growth in labor compensation and 
firm size both have positive impact on the performance of firm, which implies a lower θ  has pushed 
the threshold of firm size higher so that given a certain 0β  value (intensity of competition), size of 
firms can be larger to improve firm performance, and number of firms can also be larger in the 
industry to improve the performance of the whole industry. In other words, ICT investment brings 
new opportunities to the industry, as well as room for expansion.  
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Figure 11: Key variables of the Wholesale and retail industry.  
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Figure 12: The effects of decreasing θ . Effects are numbered as 1, 2, and 3. 
Figure 12 illustrates the three simultaneous effects numbered as 1, 2, and 3, of the decreasing cost 
of information processing: 
 
 As more firms enter the industry, the intermediate input market turns less volatile, pushing 0β  
higher20, which is negative to the aggregate firm performance.  

 As more firms enter the industry, labor market becomes stringent, the rising labor cost would 
squeeze information rent for each firm. Thus it’s negative as well. 
But for the industry as a whole, before number of firms coming to a certain level, aggregate firm 
performance could be improving as production switches from market-organized style to firm style. 
At this stage, that more firms come in with positive profit outweighs that each firm has less profit 
than before.  

 θ  has the effect of pushing up the threshold of firm size. Thus the optimal firm size would be 
larger– therefore it is a positive effect.  
Accordingly, the generally positive effect of ICT investment over the wholesale and retail industry 
keeps happening as long as positive effects more than compensate the negative effect, which means 
when 0β  and w  do not increase to too high. 
Thus the story of the wholesale and retail industry can be well explained by our model. 
 
Case II: The financial and insurance industry 
                                                          
20 See footnote 8. 
3 
2 
1 
 θ ↓  
More firm entry 
Larger firm size 
0  β ↑  (Intensity of  competition) 
wage ↑  (Stringent labor market) 
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Figure 13: Key variables of the finance and insurance industry 
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Figure 13 displays the different growth patterns that the finance and insurance industry of each 
economy follows. For example, ICT growth of the U.S. finance and insurance industry is among the 
highest, accompanied by low labor quality growth and median level labor compensation growth; yet 
the nominal labor productivity growth is in the median-low zone. Combining data on its firm size in 
the industry, evidence is clear that increasing intensity of competition is the reason that keeps 
improvement of aggregate firm performance low, while labor compensation grows relatively high. 
The U.K. and Australia cases are different. They have relatively high IT accumulation, negative labor 
quality growth, but relatively high labor compensation growth. And these features deliver them 
significant improvement in aggregate firm performance. Possible explanation is that as the cost of 
information processing is cut down by ICT investment, while competition in the industry intensifies 
in the sense of both more number of firms and larger firm size (Australia firm size data does support 
this story), the positive effects outweighs the negative effects described by Figure 13. Thus we see a 
double high growth in firm performance and labor compensation. 
 
Table 2: Finance and insurance industry regression results 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Method of Estimation GLS OLS OLS GLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 65 65 65 64 64 228 228 228 
Regressand:         
Resid_gtfp Yes   Yes Yes    
gtfp  Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Regressors:         
gitph 0.14* -0.03 -0.01 0.15* 0.07 -0.06* -0.07* -0.08* 
gitph(-1) - - - -0.12 -0.05 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
gilcph -0.20 0.22* 0.16 -0.22 -0.02 0.26** 0.28** 0.29** 
fz -2.51** -1.43 -0.29 -1.96 -0.34 - - - 
C 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Fixed country Yes Yes None Yes None Yes None Yes 
Fixed period None None Yes None Yes None Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.37 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.24 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.39 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.88 0.00 0.06 0.01 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.65 2.40 1.89 2.66 2.44 1.73 1.57 1.72 
* 10% significant; ** 5% significant. 
 
The formal econometric analysis of the finance and insurance industry data is ambiguous, however.  
Generally, the following observations are made: (1) when firm size is controlled, growth of IT capital 
stock has positive impact; when firm size is dropped, the impact of growth of IT capital stock turns 
significantly negative; (2) the growth of labor compensation in the industry has positive impact on 
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the performance of firms; (3) period fixed effect is more suitable for this industry, rather than fixed 
country effect.  
Recall Figure 13, the story implied for the finance and insurance industry is that accelerated 
investment in IT reduces cost of information processing. According to our model, it pushes up the 
threshold of optimal firm size, thus enabling the expansion of the size of each firm. On the other 
hand, lower information processing cost would continue to enable more entry of firms in to the 
industry, pushing up industrial labor compensation. This would push up the 0β value, while turning 
the firm size effect to be negative.  In the case of the finance and insurance industry, in contrast to 
the previous industry discussed, that firm size effect turns negative is due to that 0β  - intensity of 
competition - is already large enough. 
 
Fixed country effect 
Fixed country effect in our regressions displays ambiguous results. In the wholesale and retail 
industry, fixed effect for a certain country has different signs in regressions with equation (5.2) and 
equation (5.3).  Under equation (5.2), the U.S. has positive fixed effect, yet it is neither unique nor 
the most significant one. Under equation (5.3), the U.S. fixed effect is actually negative. In the 
finance and retail industry, the U.S. fixed effect is always negative, while other countries’ fixed effect 
being positive or negative.  
Within the framework of this study, we are examining what contribute to the growth of the residual 
term of an industrial production function, as well as the magnitude that these factors contribute to it. 
After all productive factors have been well paid for its service (equation 5.1)21, the residual term 
states the ability of the industry to generate surplus, which, according to our analysis, is basically due 
to the information processing ability of firms. Generally speaking, there is no unique country effect 
in the growth of this residual term for the U.S., which is not consistent with the hypothesis that 
there is a first-mover advantage attached to the U.S. Rather, the growth of this residual term can be 
explained by ICT investment (with its capital-deepening effect filtered), intensity of market 
competition, and the size of firms. And these factors impact on the aggregate performance of firms 
in the industry, in the way that our model can predict.  
                                                          
21 Our residual term estimated is trivially different from the TFP data provided by the EU-KLEMS database, 
which is estimated using growth accounting approach. 
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The policy implication is that any country can conduct an optimal ICT investment strategy, combined 
with industrial organization policy to improve the performances of the service industries, thus 
leading to a higher growth path.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We started with the enquiry that how the information and communication technology (ICT) 
improves firm performance, so as to improve the performance of the industry, as well as that of the 
economy, which is argued by empirical literature.  Then a model of firm in a certain industry with 
demand uncertainty is developed.  
Initially in the model, there are only individual producers specialized at two different stage of 
production, coordinated via an intermediate input market. However, facing demand uncertainty in 
both two markets, efficiency of resource allocation is lower than a full information scenario. 
Alternatively, if we count the availability property of the products in this model as the only type of 
quality, the model means that under demand uncertainty, product quality would be lower or a 
higher price is charged for the same quality as compared to full information scenario. A firm then is 
organized to eliminate uncertainty in the intermediate input market. The realization of a firm 
organization in this model is as described by Figure 6, where a firm hires workers and divide them 
into two groups: one producing and one producing . To assume away any special technological 
advantage of a firm, it is assumed that in the final product market, the firm is still loosely organized 
as several shops ran by individual  producers. 
The firm, although without assuming special technological advantage, manages to provide final 
product with higher availability (or higher quality), charging a higher price in the market. This way 
the firm would gain an excessive surplus, which we refer to as information rent, after all production 
factors being well paid at market rate of compensation, provided that the cost of processing 
information in order to run this organization.  
All these come by assumptions. However, it is via the model that we understand in what ways the 
cost of information processing, intensity of market competition, as well as size of the firm affect this 
information rent. 
To test if these theoretical predictions apply to real economy, the paper conducted case studies on 
the wholesale and retail industry, and the finance and insurance industry. Choosing service 
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industries to examine our model prediction is basically for the convenience of analysis, as the service 
industries fit our model assumptions in many ways.  
It is found that ICT investment has different patterns of impact over the two service industries. In the 
wholesale and retail industry, ICT investment brings positive impact directly; indirectly, it pushes up 
the threshold of optimal firm size and allows more firms to enter, making the aggregate effect 
positive to aggregate firm performance. In the finance and insurance industry, as intensity of 
competition is already high, lower information cost soon pushes firm size effect into negative – firm 
size exceeding optimal threshold; the positive sign of labor compensation term means that it is 
working in another way round, in which higher labor cost curbs firm entry, relieving information rent 
from the squeeze of labor cost. 
Lastly, we learn from the fixed country effect coefficients that it is unlikely that there is a first-mover 
advantage attached to any single economy. Rather, different economies could adjust their ICT 
investment strategies according to the development stage with corresponding market structure of 
the specific industry. This is because that ICT investment does not necessarily and automatically 
bring better industrial performance – therefore not necessarily the higher the better. It depends on 
many other factors, especially intensity of market competition, that we should consider in policy-
making. 
To put an end to this stage of study, bear in mind that the current research is a partial equilibrium 
analysis, rather than general equilibrium analysis, of one industry. Also we have assumed away 
capital investment and human capital accumulation in the model. By adding those into consideration 
could generate the dynamic pattern of performance improvement related to information processing.  
Moreover, one might find the convex production technology too strong an assumption. 
Thus future researches can be conducted in at least two ways: One is to establish general 
equilibrium analysis with multi-sector and multi-product; the other is to introduce dynamic analysis 
to see the evolution of performances of industries and the overall economy. 
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Appendix A 
 
Stability of equilibrium with market-coordinated production 
§ Equilibrium as the intersection of demand and supply curves 
To show that the equilibrium exists for the final product market, we can derive the consumer’s 
demand curve and the X -producer’s supply curve. Consumers demand is readily described by 
equation (2.1). Now we derive the producer’s supply curve. 
For the X -producer, 
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iXP
I
 is the reverse of demand from one consumer. As what the producer cares about is how much 
price to set for exactly one unit of demand, we can safely put 1iX
P
I
= . 
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Then we end up with 
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Since 
1
( ) ( )
A A
X M
MQ F k m Q P
α
λ= < ⋅ , the above equation is exactly equal to equation (2.3). 
Thus this equation describes the producer’s supply curve (consumer’s requirement on combinations 
of price and availability is ignored here so as to derive producer’s independent optimal behavior). 
To find out the intersection of the consumer’s demand curve and the producer’s supply curve, 
simply substitute iXP  with equation (2.1). 
Then we are lead back to equation (2.3).  
 
§ Existence of Global Equilibrium 
Suppose that an individual X -producer produces at ( ')m α , and m’>m*. Then he sets a price 
according to 1
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= , assuming that 0β  is the reverse of a commonly 
accepted shadow price of one actual unit of demand in the x market. 
This producer’s profit is, 
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And without deviation, the expected profit is, 
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When * 1
4
3
m λ< , which is always the case, 
( ) ( ' ) 0iX iXE Eπ π− > . Thus any deviation is not an optimal choice. 
 
Let ( ') 2 '( ' )L m m m m m m= − + − .  
It can be shown that 
3( ' )
'
L
m m
m
∂
= −
∂
,  
which is positive when m’>m, and negative when m’<m. In the first case, it means m’ should be 
decreased so as to reduce the positive gap between expected profit at m and expected profit at m’; 
in the latter case, it means m’ should be increased so as to reduce the positive gap between 
expected profit at m and expected profit at m’. Thus there is incentive to converge to m. 
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Appendix B 
 
Wages in the labor market 
Wages offered by the firm should be at least as high as the certainty equivalent income of the 
expected net revenue of the typical producers of m and x under market organized production and 
exchange.  
Assume that an individual spends all his income in consuming the product X .  
Step 1: from ( )U x  to ( )U π - a transformation, 
0( ) ( ) ( )A
X
m
X
U x Q P U
P
π π β π= × = × =  
Step 2: finding certainty equivalent income. 
As the utility of π  is a linear function. It implies that the certainty equivalent income is ( )E π  itself. 
Thus at equilibrium, wage is set at ( ) ( )X Mw E Eπ π= = . 
